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ABSTRACT

Previous studies have shown that an applicant'sability to obtain a
patent is inexorably linked to the random assignment of a patent
examiner.1 However, not all patent examiners are created equal. Some
patent examiners allow patentapplicationsquickly within just one or two
Office Actions, resulting in only a few months of substantive patent
prosecution. In contrast, otherpatent examiners constantly rejectpatents
applications,which can result in unnecessarilydelayingprosecutionand
years of substantive patent prosecution. This study focuses on how
different examiners use prior art rejections to prolong or compact
prosecution.
Prior art rejections are one of the most important hurdles to
obtaining a patent. Specifically, the use of prior art rejections directly
impacts the time and effort it takes to obtain a patent. Anticipation and
obviousness rejections are usually the most important and difficult
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1See

Sean Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw: An EmpiricalStudy ofExaminer Allowance Rates, 2012

STAN. TECH. L. REV. 10, 14 (2012) [hereinafter Tu, Luck/Unluck ofthe Draw]; see also Shine Sean
&

Tu, Three New Metricsfor PatentExaminerActivity: Office Actions per GrantRatio (OGR), Office
Actions per Disposal Ratio (ODR), and Grant to Examiner Ratio (GER), 100 J. PAT.
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 277 (2018) [hereinafter Tu, Three New Metrics for Patent Examiner
Activity]; see also Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review
Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents? Evidence from Aicrolevel
Application Data, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550 (2017), https://content.ebscohost.com/

ContentServer.asp?T=P&P=AN&K= 124164320&S=R&D=buh&EbscoContent-dGJyMMvl7ES
ep7E4v%2BbwOLCmsEiep7B SsKu4Sq6WxWXS&ContentCustomer-dGJyMPGsrlCOrrdKuePf
geyx44Dt6flA [https://perma.cc/NU6K-KXPZ].
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obstacles to overcome before obtaininga patent.2 This empirical study
focuses on how different types of examiners (i.e., fast/high volume versus
slow/low volume) use prior art rejections to either compact or delay
prosecution. Since patent examination is dependent on both examiner and
applicant behavior, this study also evaluates how applicants respond to
these priorart rejections to alsoprolongor compressprosecution. Unlike
many studies, this is the first one that evaluates patent quality based on
both individual examiner characteristics, as well as applicant behavior
at the patentprosecution level.
In sum, high volume, average volume, and low volume examiners
issued a patent in approximately 1.64 years, 3.07 years, and 5.85 years,
respectively. Thus, high volume examiners issue patents almost twice as
quickly as average volume examiners and more than three times asfast
as low volume examiners. This large difference can represent a huge
investment in both capital and time for the applicant, as well as for the
PTO.
Additionally, this study finds that low volume examiners reject
applications based mainly on obviousness, issuing over four times as
many obviousness rejections per Office Action as compared to high
volume examiners. Furthermore, low volume examiners issue five times
as many Section 102(a), (g), or (e) rejections and two times as many
Section 102(b) rejections. And applicants most commonly make a
"missing element" argument to traverse a slow examiner's Section
102(a), (g) or (e) rejection at three times the rate ofa fast examiner. This
type of traversal strategy relies on the examiner's misunderstandingof
either the art or the claimed invention. Similarly, applicantsalso use the
"missing elements" argument to traverse a slow examiner'sSection 103
rejection atfive times the rate ofa fast examiner. Finally, applicantsare
also three times more likely to use a "teaching away" or "unexpected
results" argument to traverse a slow examiner compared to a fast
examiner. Both of these arguments can again rely on either the
examiner's misunderstandingof the prior art or a misunderstandingof
the claimed invention.
This study demonstrates that different types of examiners use
dfferent strategies to maximize their "counts. " Specifically, low volume
examiners will generally reject applications, creating lengthy
prosecution histories andforcing the applicant to narrow claims, while
showing a misunderstandingof either the prior art and/or the claimed
invention. In contrast, high volume examiners will usually only make one

2 See

Stephen Yelderman, PriorArt in the District Court, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 840
(2019), ndlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/7.-Yelderman.pdf [https://perma.cc/M77RS99A] ("[A]mong all [the] patent cases filed in 2008 and 2009, 154 sumnmary judgment motions
were filed on the basis of anticipation. . . .").
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rejection before allowing the case, thus creating a small prosecution
history with only small amendments to the claims.
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INTRODUCTION

Preventing examination errors at the patent office should always be
an aspirational goal for all examiners at the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO). However, quality prosecution also includes a
temporal factor. Balancing speed with patent quality should be the goal
of the PTO. It has previously been shown, however, that the patent
examination process is not homogenous.3 Specifically, there are two
distinct populations of examiners. First, there are high volume examiners
who issue, on average, more than fifty patents per year. Second, there are
low volume examiners who issue, on average, less than five patents per
year.
The main empirical question this Article explores is how high
volume ("fast") and low volume ("slow") examiners behave differently
from average volume examiners when using prior art rej ections. Previous
studies have argued that retaining experienced examiners is one crucial
key to solving the patent quality crisis.4 This Article attempts to
determine whether this argument is true by examining how different types
of experienced examiners use prior art to prolong or expedite prosecution.
Part I is a brief summary of the patent examination process and the
examiner count system that is associated with the examination process.
3 See

Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw, supra note 1; see also Tu, Three New Aetrics for Patent
Examiner Activity, supra note 1; see also Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner
Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 817 (2012), https://

law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/publication/270628/doc/slspublic/rest_a
00194.pdf [https://penna.cc/3DU3-8UVM].
4 See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN
PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT

(2004).
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Part II provides the background for and describes the previous literature
in this area. Part III describes the new dataset created for this study, as
well as the strengths and limitations of the dataset. Part IV describes the
results of this study. Part V concludes and discusses the potential
implications of policy changes to the PTO examination procedure.
I.

THE PATENT PROSECUTION PROCESS

The PTO currently is staffed with 9,614 patent examiners and
12,652 employees. 5 In recent years, the examiner corps has allowed over
300,000 patents per year. 6 Additionally, the PTO has over $3.38 billion
in assets from fees generated in association with the PTO.7
Unquestionably, the PTO commands a large workforce with an enormous
pool of resources. However, even in light of its workforce and budget,
the backlog of patent applications still stands at over 497,164
applications. 8
A. PTO Efforts to Improve PriorArt SearchingandAnalysis
The PTO provides its examiners with many resources to assist with
prior art searches. 9 Specifically, the PTO makes experts available to each
examiner "to help with search strategies based on technology and
classification, as well as assistance with available search tools." 10
Furthermore, the office is examining how new technologies such as
artificial intelligence can be used to help locate and retrieve relevant prior
art for examiners." Additionally, the PTO tested new processes to
leverage examiners in foreign offices to help U.S. examiners use
collaborative searches for prior art. 12
B. PatentExamination Process
When an application is sent to the PTO, it is reviewed to ensure all
procedural requirements are met for a filing date.13 Applications are then

5 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 12 fig.3

(2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY19PAR.pdf [https://penna.
cc/WKE5-WKMZ].
6 See id. at 169 tbl.6.
7 Id. at 30.
8 See id. at 169 tbl.5 (identifying in the 2019 "Summary of Total Pending Patent Applications"
442,591 applications as "Awaiting First Action by Examiner" and 54,573 applications as
"Undocketed").
9 See id. at 54.
10
11
12
13

Id.
Id.
Id.
See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT

EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 506 (9th ed., Rev. 8, Jan. 2018) [hereinafter MPEP]; see also 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.53 (2019), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2019-title37-voll/pdf/CFR-2019-title37
-voll-secl-53.pdf [https://penna.cc/4TG3-SP6A].
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sorted for examination by an "Art Unit." 1 4 Each art unit has a group of
examiners who are related by similar technologies. 15 Once in the art unit,
a supervisory patent examiner (SPE) will then assign applications, for the
most part randomly, 16 to a reviewing examiner. The reviewing examiner
can be either a primary examiner or secondary examiner. A primary
examiner is usually more experienced (typically with more than five
years at the patent office), has the ability send out actions to the applicant
with limited review (signatory authority), and is not under constant
supervision. In contrast, a secondary examiner is ajunior examiner, who
usually has less than five years at the PTO, cannot send out actions to the
applicant without review, and is under the supervision of a primary
examiner.
After applications are assigned, examiners review the specification
and closely examine the claims. The reviewing examiner then conducts a
search for prior art that may render the application unpatentable (usually
due to anticipation or obviousness). Examiners search within databases
such as prior U.S. patents or applications, foreign patents, and/or nonpatent literature, including scientific or technical journals. The reviewing
examiner then assesses the novelty and non-obviousness of the claims in
light of the prior art that was found and the prior art disclosed by the
14 "The term, Art Unit, refers to the group of professionals responsible for a cluster of related patent
art." Patent Classification,USPTO: PATENTS, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/
patent-search/classification-standards-and-development [https://perma.cc/36KR-HDS8].
15 See PatentTechnology CentersManagement, USPTO: PATENTS, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/

[https://penna.cc/E6GY-YV9S]
contact-patents/patent-technology-centers-management
(indicating the types of technology that correspond with each specific Technology Center). "Art
Units are currently identified by a four digit number .... " Patent Classification,supra note 14.
Each hundreds unit i.e., 1600, 1700, 2100, 2400,2600, 2700,2800, 2900, 3600, 3700-represents
a large technology group. See Patent Technology Centers Management, supra. For example,
Technology Center 1600 examines patent applications involving biotechnology and organic
chemistry, while Technology Center 2100 examines patent applications concerning computer
architecture software and information security. Id. Moreover, each tens unit-i.e., 10, 20, 1630, 40,
50, 60-represents a smaller, more narrowly focused category of the Technology Center's much
broader Art Unit. See, e.g., TC 1600 ManagementRoster: Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry,
USPTO: PATENTS, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/contact-patents/tc-1600-management-roster
[https://perma.cc/MQB3-MM3T]. For example, while 1610 examines patent applications claiming
organic compounds, 2110 examines patent applications claiming computer error control, reliability,
and/or control systems. See id.; see also TC 2100ManagementRoster:ComputerArchitecture and

Software, USPTO: PATENTS, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/contact-patents/tc-2100-managementroster [https://penna.cc/G39D-T32K]. Finally, the unit digit-i.e., 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9represents the specific class of technology examined by each individual Art Unit in a Technology
Center. See, e.g., Classes Arranged by Art Unit: Art Units 1611-1763, USPTO: PATENTS, https://
www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/classes-arranged-art-unit-art-units-1611-1763 [https:/
/perma.cc/EPF7-GAS8]. For example, Art Unit 1611 examines patent applications for drug, bioaffecting, and body treating compositions, while Art Unit 2115 examines patent applications for
electrical computers and digital data processing systems. See id.; see also ClassesArrangedby Art
Unit: Art Units 1764-2691, USPTO: PATENTS, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/
classes-arranged-art-unit-art-units-1764-2691 [https://perma.cc/D23U-29MK].
16 "SPEs for the most part assign[] applications . . to particular examiners on the basis of the last
digit of the application serial number." See Lemley & Sampat, supra note 3, at 822. However, "[a]
minority of supervisory examiners assign[] applications on the basis of docket management, giving
the oldest unassigned application to an examiner when that examiner [has] finished examining a
prior application." Id.
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applicant. Furthermore, the reviewing examiner will determine if the
claims have written support, utility, and are enabled.
If there is no prior art and the claims are properly described and
enabled, the examiner will issue a notice of allowance. However, first
action allowances are a relatively rare occurrence.17 More commonly, the
examiner will reject the claims for one of the reasons listed above." The
applicant then has no more than six months to respond to the Office
Action. Usually, the applicant will take one or both of the following
actions: (1) amend the claims to traverse the rej ections, and/or (2) traverse
the rejection based on scientific or legal arguments.
If the examiner is persuaded by the response, they can allow the
case. If the examiner is not persuaded, they can reject using the same
rejections as in the first Office Action or reject based on new grounds.
Depending on the arguments made by the applicant (and if the examiner
finds them persuasive), the examiner can then choose to make their next
response either "final" or "non-final." The applicant has six months to
choose one of several common options: (1) file a Request for Continued
Examination (RCE) to continue examination, essentially continuing
prosecution where the examiner left off; (2) file a notice of appeal,
appealing the rejections to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
(BPAI); (3) abandon the application; or (4) file a continuation application
or continuation-in-part (CIP) application. Filing a continuation or CIP
application can be done in conjunction with filing an RCE, notice of
appeal, or abandonment. The process then repeats itself until a patent is
allowed or the applicant abandons the application.
C. The Count System
Examiners measure their productivity through the count system, 19
which is a system that has adapted to new technologies, increased
availability of prior art, adjustments in policy and legal interpretations,
and a host of other changes. The most recent comprehensive changes
were made in 2010, in an attempt to equally balance productivity and
quality along with, to a lesser degree, timeliness and customer service. 20

17 See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examining PatentExamination, 2010 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 2, 4 tbl.1 (2010), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0689/105c94ebelbfed396191a91ca4c3bf
905c88.pdf [https://perna.cc/AC9Y-Q6NP].
18 See id. ("86.5% of the PTO's first office actions were non-final rejections.").
19 For a complete discussion of the count system, see Naira Rezende Simmons, Putting Yourselfin
the Shoes of a Patent Examiner: Overview of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) Patent Examiner Production (Count) System, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.

32 (2017), https://repositoryjmls.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1422&context=ripl [https://
perma.cc/JAS2-82LN].
20 Id. at 37. Four elements are used to evaluate an examiner's overall yearly performance: (1)
Production (35%), (2) Quality (35%), (3) Docket Management (20%), and (4) Stakeholder
Interaction (10%). Id.
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Patent examiners are evaluated based on how many "counts" they
accrue. Each new patent application can give an examiner 2.0 credits (or
counts), allocated according to the figure below:
Figure 1.

M~~~-

~ pp
-~
-------

To incentivize examiners to initially perform the best search and
provide the most relevant rejections, subsequent applications provide less
weight. An RCE is a mechanism by which the PTO can reopen
prosecution of a patent application after receiving a final Office Action.
When the applicant files their first RCE, the first office on the merits after
the RCE is filed will now be worth only 1.00 count instead of 1.25 counts.
However, if the examiner allows the case after the FOAM after the RCE,
the examiner will receive 3.25 counts (1.25 + 0.25 + 1.00 + 0.25 + 0.5).
After the second RCE is filed, the FOAM after the second RCE will only
be worth 0.75. Accordingly, if the examiner allows the case after the
FOAM after the second RCE, the examiner will receive 4.75 counts (1.25
+ 0.25 + 1.00 + 0.25 + 0.75 + 0.25 + 0.5).21 The diminishing counts
received from an RCE can be justified because the examiner is reviewing
the same application and should not have to relearn the entire
specification.
The sheer numbers of applications and examiners necessitate that
the PTO and the Patent Office Professional Association (POPA) use a
basic formula to maintain quality standards.22 The new count system has
created an equation that considers examiners' workload, their experience
level, and the complexity of the technology they are examining. After all,
examiners with more experience should theoretically be able to work
more efficiently, and those who are dealing with especially intricate
technologies such as gene therapy will have more research to do than
those dealing with fishing lures. 23
21 See PATENT OFFICE PROF'L ASS'N, PATENT EXAMINER PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PLAN

(PAP) GUIDELINES 5 (2012), http://www.popa.org/static/media/uploads/uploads/examiner-papguidelines-04_19_12-508.pdf [https://perna.cc/5FDT-AG96].
22 Formed in 1964, POPA is an independent union of patent examiners.
23 The PTO suggests, for example, that an examiner might expect to spend 16.6 hours per
Production Unit on a fishing lure application but 27.7 hours per Production Unit on technology
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The number of examining hours includes all of the examiners'
time for reviewing applications, analyzing the claims, searching and
considering prior art, consulting colleagues, writing Office Actions,
addressing applicants' responses, and all other related administrative
activities. The amount of time an examiner should spend on an
application is tied to the technological field, as well as their position in
the general schedule (GS) pay scale, with GS-12 representing a Position
Factor of 1.0.24
The current formula for determining hours per Production Unit
is:

(# ofExamininga Hours) x (Senioritv Factor) = (Counts Needed for Goal)
(Technology Complexity)
2
Thus, if two examiners of different seniority levels work the same number
of hours in a fortnight in the same art unit and with the same technology
complexity, they will have different work expectations. The following
example contains two examiners of different seniority (one is a junior
examiner of GS-5 and the other a GS-12) who work seventy-two hours
within a two-week period and deal with the same Immunotherapy Art
Unit:
GS-5: (72 hours x 0.55 seniority factor)/(25.9 complexity) = (3.1 Counts)/2
GS-12: (72 hours x 1.0 seniority factor)/(25.9 complexity) = (5.6 Counts)/2
Accordingly, the GS-12 examiner will have an output expectation that is
almost double that of the GS-5 examiner.
D. PatentExaminerIncentives-CountMaximization
Strategies
Like any formulaic system, the count system incentivizes
examiners to maximize their number of counts. Thus, the U.S. count

dealing with satellite communication. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT QUALITY
CHAT: EXAMINATION TIME ANALYSIS 21 (2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/patent-quality-chat-april-presentation.pdf [https://perna.cc/U6SE-L6UJ]. Note that
one Production Unit (PU) equals two "counts." Id. at 22. Seniority is measured using the following
chart:

Seniority Factor Adjustment

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EXAMINATION TIME AND THE PRODUCTION SYSTEM

16

(2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Examination%/`20Time%/`20and%/`20
the%20Production%20System.pdf [https://perna.cc/Y65V-NLDK].
24 See PATENT OFFICE PROF'L ASS'N, supra note 21, at 3-4.
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system, to a large degree, rewards quantity. There are two main strategies
by which an examiner can maximize counts. The first method for count
maximization calls for examiners to dispose of a case quickly, either
through abandonment or allowance, in one or two Office Actions. If an
examiner can quickly get the applicant to allowance (or abandonment)
within one or two Office Actions, this will gamer many counts for the
examiner. The second method for count maximization calls for examiners
to maximize counts by cycling through rejections and forcing applicants
to file multiple Requests for Continued Examination (RCEs) or
continuation applications. This second method calls for more work by the
examiner because they are continually coming up with new rejections.
This study shows that fast examiners maximize counts by quickly
allowing cases ("Strategy 1"), while slow examiners maximize counts by
cycling through rejections ("Strategy 2").
1.

Strategy 1: High Allowance Rate Count Maximization
Strategy-One Office Action with Minimal Claim
Amendments Then Allowance

There are incentives and strategies by which an examiner can use
rejections to gamer additional counts. The first method to maximize
counts is to have a large volume of smaller value counts. By allowing
many cases after one non-final rejection, these examiners can gamer the
greatest number of counts with the least amount of effort in the shortest
amount of time.
This first strategy for maximizing counts relies on cycling quickly
through patent applications by rejecting the application once, and then
disposing of the case (i.e., either through allowance or abandonment).
Although the examiner does not have control over applicant
abandonment, the examiner does have control over allowance. This study
finds that examiners who have a high allowance rate may be following
this strategy to maximize counts. Examiners who employ this strategy
will usually allow more cases and do so with only one or two rejections.
Counts are maximized because examiners will get a total of two counts
per application. Additionally, by allowing the application after one Office
Action, and allowing many applications, the counts are maximized with
little applicant resistance. 25
In addition, the time factor may play a role because senior
primary examiners are given a shorter amount of time to review an
application than junior examiners or even other primary examiners who
just gained signatory authority. 2 6 Because senior examiners are required

25
26

Applicants rarely appeal an allowance.
See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 1.
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to examine more cases in less time, quick allowance can be the path of
least resistance to count maximization.
Previous studies have shown that more experienced primary
examiners maximize their counts by quickly allowing cases.27
Specifically, many experienced primary examiners allow cases with little
to no claim amendments, and have a much higher rate of first action
allowances. 28 These examiners have much less time to review patent
applications because more senior examiners are required to gamer more
counts in less time.
One goal of this study is to determine how experienced examiners
are allowing cases by determining how different examiners use prior art
rejections to either prolong or compact prosecution. Additionally, this
study examines each claim and the prosecution history of each claim to
determine if the examiner is allowing "high quality" patents.
2. Strategy 2: Low Allowance Rate Count Maximization
Strategy-Several Office Actions with RCEs and CONs
with Many Rejections
The second strategy for count maximization is more complex.
Examiners in this group maximize their counts by rejecting the
application and forcing applicants to file RCEs or continuation
applications. Examiners can gamer more than 150% of the credits (3.25
counts compared to 2.00 counts) if they allow the case after an RCE. 29
Accordingly, examiners may maximize their counts by following
a rejection/RCE strategy. If an examiner generates a continuous stream
of rejections, they can maximize their counts by forcing the applicant to
either file an RCE or continuation applications (CONs, CTPs, and/or
DIVs). Each new family member creates a new stream of counts. Thus,
if the examiner continues to reject the application, the applicant may be
forced to file child applications, which allows the examiner to gamer even
more counts in the future. Alternatively, the applicant can file an appeal.
No counts are credited to the examiner if rejections are reversed on
appeal, and the application will simply return to its prior stage of
prosecution. However, applicants do not typically appeal their
applications because of increased time delay and higher costs.
There are two factors that compound the problem and give the
examiner even more incentive to reject. First, RCE and continuation
practice allow an examiner to spend less time to issue more rejections.
Second, examiners face less scrutiny when issuing rejections as compared

27 See Tu, Luck/Unluck ofthe Draw, supra note 1, at 14; see also Tu, Three New Aetricsfor Patent
Examiner Activity, supra note 1.

28 See Lemley & Sampat, supra note 3.
29 See discussion supra Section I.C.
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to allowing an application. As discussed below, this scrutiny issue can be
especially pronounced when comparing experienced examiners with
junior examiners.
First, examiners may be incentivized to reject applications
because there is a quota system in place. This quota system decreases the
amount of time examiners can spend on an application as they accumulate
experience at the PTO. RCE and continuation practice can allow
examiners to gamer more counts in a shorter amount of time. The
specification of a continuation application (and RCE) is substantially
similar or identical to the parent application. Thus, if an applicant is
forced to file a continuation application or RCE, the examiner should
need much less time to review and understand the claimed technology,
because the review was already completed in the parent application.
Accordingly, it should require less work for the examiner to come up with
(1) art rejections because the examiner need only complete a new search
and review any new pieces of art3 0 and (2) written description/enablement
rejections 3 1 because the specification is identical to the parent application.
Therefore, forcing applicants to file RCEs and/or continuation
applications allows the examiner to spend less time to gamer more
counts.
One might assume that this time pressure would force more
senior examiners to reject applications, thereby maximizing counts while
reducing the time needed to review applications. Interestingly, most
senior primary examiners do not avail themselves of this strategy. In
contrast, this strategy is used by many secondary examiners and, to a
large extent, by examiners who are most junior. Previous studies have
shown that less experienced secondary examiners maximize their counts
by issuing many more rejections and fewer patents.3 2 This strategy does
require the examiner to come up with multiple rejections; however, this
issue is mitigated because secondary examiners are given much more
time to work on a case as compared to their primary examiner
counterparts.
Second, this rejection strategy may be particularly attractive to
secondary (junior) examiners who are subjected to more scrutiny when
they allow a case. To allow a case, the secondary examiner: (1) needs to
get approval from the primary examiner working with them, and then (2)

30 An examiner can more efficiently understand the prior art because they have already read some
of that art in their previous rejections. Additionally, the examiner does not need to review the
applicant's specification to compare it to the prior art reference, as this should have been done
previously in the parent application.
31 If an applicant makes a claim amendment, the examiner does not need to review the specification
because, in examining the parent application, they already should have done so.
32 See Lemley & Sampat, supra note 3, at 822.
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the application needs to go for quality review before the patent issues. In
contrast, a rejection is only reviewed by the primary examiner.
Additionally, there are minimal consequences or punishments
when bad rejections are issued, hence there may be a censoring toward
rejections. In fact, a barrage of rejections may actually benefit the junior
examiner, as it may seem that the examiner has done a complete and
thorough job. On the surface, a voluminous Office Action that is based
on many prior art rejections may signal a comprehensive prior art search
with an exhaustive set of rejections. However, one must delve much
deeper into the Office Action and specific rejections to determine if the
examiner was rigorous or repetitive in their rejections. Furthermore,
when an application is rejected, it usually does not go to Quality
Assurance, and thus avoids review.
In contrast, the consequences for an erroneous allowance can be
significant. An examiner may lose privileges or suffer institutional
ridicule when issuing bad patents.3 3 Furthermore, under the "Second Pair
of Eyes" review program, there has been anecdotal evidence that two
"reversals" could result in termination. 3 4 Importantly, the relationship
between the supervising primary and secondary examiner may be
damaged if the supervising examiner catches too many errors by the
secondary examiner. Specifically, if the supervising primary examiner
becomes wary of the secondary examiner's erroneous allowances, the
supervising examiner may scrutinize the work of the secondary examiner
much more carefully before allowing future applications. Furthermore, if
an error is caught by Quality Assurance, then the repercussions for the
junior examiner may even be more substantial.
Finally, the most junior examiners have one additional, but very
important, reason to default to rejection of applications. Specifically,
junior examiners cannot join the Patent Office Professional Association
unless they have two years of service. Once examiners become members
of POPA, it becomes increasingly difficult for the PTO to terminate their
employment. Accordingly, junior examiners may be more willing to
reject claims at a higher rate to avoid unfavorable reviews, thereby
lowering their chances of getting fired within the first two years.
It is true that applicants have the ability to appeal an examiner's
decision to the PTAB or further to the U.S. District Court for the District
33 See DANIEL WRIGHT, PATENTLY SILLY: FROM THE COLLAPSIBLE WALKER TO THE
INCINERATING TOILET, THE CRAZIEST INVENTIONS EVER DEVISED (2009); see also RICK
FEINBERG, PECULIAR PATENTS: A COLLECTION OF UNUSUAL AND INTERESTING INVENTIONS
FROM THE FILES OF THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE (1994).

34 See Warren Woessner, Second Pair of Eyes Review
Is the Wicked Witch Really Dead?,
PATENTS4LIFE (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.patents4life.com/2009/10/second-pair-of-eyes-reviewis-the-wicked-witch-really-dead/ [https://perna.cc/86T6-VFTD] ("One Examiner . . [explained]
that if he received two 'reversals' from a[] SPOE [(Second Pair of Eyes)] review, he could be
fired.").
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of Columbia and then to the Federal Circuit. However, this avenue may
be expensive and unavailable to those inventors who are trying to patent
their invention on a budget.35 Those inventors who are using the patent
system as a signal to obtain venture capital funding may impair their
chances of getting funding if they (1) fail to obtain a patent, (2) continue
to fail to obtain a patent after PTAB and/or judicial review, and (3) fail
to generate a strong patent portfolio. 36
Some commentators argue that this trend suggests that junior
examiners are doing more work and rejecting applications with more
rigor early in their career, while doing less work and allowing more
patents as their tenure increases. 3 7 This argument makes logical sense
because senior examiners are given much less time to review applications
when compared to their junior counterparts. This Article argues,
however, that this trend is mainly a function of the count system and the
incentives it generates. Specifically, for some examiners, there are few
repercussions (and actually some benefits) for generating Office Actions
with numerous rejections. In fact, under the current count system, some
examiners may have an incentive to default to the rejection of
applications. In fact, examiners who issue Office Actions with a litany of
rejections may be considered more thorough in their examination process.
II.

BACKGROUND

The Patent and Trademark Office faces two problems when it
comes to patent examination: It needs to avoid (1) issuing too many
invalid/low quality patents, and (2) issuing too few valid/high quality
patents. By focusing on prior art rejections, this study attempts to dissect
the underlying examiner behavior that may account for this behavior.
Specifically, this study attempts to quantify examiner behavior by
reviewing actual examiner rejections and allowances. Accordingly, the
Author reviewed three hundred patents from three groups of examiners:
(1) low volume allowance rate primary examiners (examiners that allow
less than five patents per year); (2) average volume allowance rate

35 PTO fees include payment for filing a notice of appeal, requesting an oral hearing, and
forwarding an appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeals Board, which costs approximately $4340 in
total ($800 + $1300 + $2240). See USPTO Fee Schedule, USPTO: LEARNING & RESOURCES, https:
//www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule#Patent%20Fees
[https://perna.cc/MT5L-AAZ9] (last revised Mar. 1, 2020). These costs do not include the
thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees that usually are associated with an appeal to the PTAB.
36 See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002), https://chicagounbound.
uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5135&context-uclrev
[https://perna.cc/QQ7Y-C93X]
(discussing the use of patents as a means to credibly publicizing information); see also Gideon
Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2005), https://
scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1294&context=pennlawreview [https://
perna.cc/K35P-95MY] (focusing on the aggregation of patents into patent portfolios as a separate
function for patents).
37 See Lemley & Sampat, supra note 3, at 822; see also Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 1.
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primary examiners (as determined by the average allowance rate for the
specific technology center);3 8 and (3) high volume allowance rate
primary examiners (examiners that allow more than fifty patents per
year). This study focuses on the "working examiner," which is the
primary examiner who worked alone on the patent application.
Previous studies have shown that not all patent examiners behave
in a similar fashion. For example, Lemley and Sampat have shown that
more experienced examiners cite less prior art and are more likely to grant
patents.3 9 Lemley and Sampat show that these effects are not due to
selection for "easier" applications, but possibly due to selective retention,
examiner tenure, technological obsolescence, or the quota system. 40
One of the underlying themes of this study is that more rejections
will result in "better/higher quality" patents. In addition, the more prior
art rejections that the invention has overcome, the stronger the patent. It
is true that more rejections may greatly narrow the scope of the patent,
such that more information disclosed in the application remains
unclaimed. This may enhance social welfare, as more of the disclosure is
dedicated to the public. However, it may also be true that the applicant
did not need to narrow the claims in the first place, if in fact the full scope
of the original claims was novel, non-obvious, useful, enabled, and fully
described. This study attempts to address this issue by reviewing the
prosecution histories from different types of examiners to determine if
there is poor or inconsistent examination.
The Lemley and Sampat study is both more and less
comprehensive than this study. It is more comprehensive because it
contains a much larger dataset that compares experienced examiners to
inexperienced examiners. However, unlike the Lemley and Sampat study,
this study focuses only on experienced examiners to determine the
variations between low volume and high volume examiners.
Additionally, unlike the Lemley and Sampat study, this study not only
focuses on the examiner Office Actions, but also surveys the applicant
responses to determine how the interplay between examiner and applicant
can cause delayed allowance. Furthermore, this study actually goes into
the prosecution history for each patent reviewed and looks: (1) to the type
of prior art rejection used, (2) the prior art that the rejection was based
on, and (3) the applicant's traversal strategies to those rejections.
Frakes and Wasserman also study examiner behavior by
comparing examiners with differing levels of experience. 4 1 Their study
suggests that as an examiner with more experience "is given less time to
For workgroup 1610-i.e., the workgroup analyzed in this study-the average allowance rate is
approximately twenty-five patents per year.
39 See Lemley & Sampat, supra note 3.
40 See id. at 822-26.
41 See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 1.
38

406

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

[Vol. 38:2

review an application, the less active [they] become[] in searching for
prior art, . . . and the more likely [they] become[] to grant the patent." 4 2
Specifically, Frakes and Wasserman find that "[a]s examination time is
cut roughly in half, . . . grant rates [can] rise by as much as [ten] to

[nineteen] percentage points, or by roughly [fifteen] to [twenty-eight
percent]." 4 3 Interestingly, they show that there is a decrease in the number
of obviousness rejections, as well as the share of prior art citations found
by examiners when moving to a higher GS level. 44 Accordingly, they
argue that patents that are granted under a shorter review time are of
"weaker-than-average quality." 4 5
The reasonable assumption underlying this "weaker-thanaverage quality" hypothesis is that patents that can overcome one or more
obviousness rejection(s) are stronger than patents that encountered fewer
or no obviousness rejections. However, this statement cannot be justified
without a detailed review of both the claims and an analysis of the
rejections proffered by the examiner. It could be that examiners who
spend more time writing multiple obviousness rejections are doing so
because of a misunderstanding of either the art or the invention, thus
increasing the number of bogus obviousness rejections. Alternatively, a
high number of obviousness rejections during prosecution might simply
be a function of a count maximization strategy based on high rejection
rates. The instant study attempts to address this issue by reviewing both
the rejections and traversal responses, as well as the claims that are issued
after issuance by differing types of examiners.
Finally, in a recent empirical study, Stephen Yelderman reviewed
the district courts' reliance on prior art to invalidate patents. 4 6 Yelderman
found that "[a]nticipation based on obscure prior art . .. [is] quite rare." 4 7
In contrast, the study found that patents invalidated by obviousness rely
on prior art that would have been difficult or impossible to find at the
time of invention. 4 8 Yelderman's study suggests that examiners should
focus more on the searching for relevant prior art references when making
an obviousness rejection, while relying more on the cited art (or
inventor's own prior work) when making an anticipation rejection.

42 Id. at 550.
43 Id. at 551.

44 See id. at 559. The number of spendable hours allotted to an examiner on an application
correlates with the general GS pay scale. Id. at 558-60, 558 tbl.3.
45 Id. at 560.
46 See Yelderman, supra note 2, at 837.
47 Id. at 837, 882-83.
48 Id. at 883-86.
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THE DATASET

As an initial matter, this dataset focuses only on primary
examiners from workgroup 1610. This workgroup was chosen because
the author has a background in pharmacology, and has prosecuted many
patent applications in this workgroup. 4 9 Accordingly, there is an element
selection bias with this dataset due to the unique issues present in
biotechnology patents. Because the author was the sole coder for the
dataset, there is consistency in both coding and expertise.
Secondary (junior) examiners-meaning examiners who lack
signatory authority-were excluded because their lack of experience
could confound the data. Additionally, junior examiners have a "ramp
up" stage where they do not allow patents early on in their career simply
because they have a docket of cases that are usually in the initial or early
stage of patent prosecution. Accordingly, only primary examiners with at
least eight years of experience were included in the dataset.
Previous studies have determined that there are three distinct
groups of examiners: (1) examiners who grant patents at a high volume,
at a rate of more than fifty patents per year ("fast examiners"); (2)
examiners who grant patents at a rate consistent with other patents in their
art unit ("average examiners"); and (3) examiners who grant patents at a
low volume, at a rate of less than five patents per year ("slow
examiners").5 0 Unlike previous studies that focus only on the procedural
aspects of issued patents, this study reviews the substantive rejections and
responses by both patent examiners and the applicant. Specifically, this
study reviews one hundred patents in each of the three specified
categories of examiners-i.e., fast examiners, average examiners, and
slow examiners-and takes into account the prosecution histories of these
patents.
Specifically, from these three groups (fast, average, and slow
examiners), ten examiners were randomly chosen from each group, and
then ten patents from each of those examiners were randomly chosen.
Thus, each group contained one hundred randomly chosen patents from
the ten randomly chosen examiners. Accordingly, the complete dataset
contained three hundred patents from thirty different examiners. The
patent prosecution histories were then reviewed, and prior art rejections
and traversal responses were coded.

49 The author's pertinent credentials are as follows: B.S. in Microbiology and B.S. in Chemistry,
University of Florida (1997); Ph.D. in Pharmacology, Cornell University (2003); Associate with
Foley & Lardner (Chemical, Biotechnology & Pharmaceutical Practice/Life Science and
Nanotechnology Industry Team).
50 See Tu, Luck/Unluck ofthe Draw, supra note 1, at 14.
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A. Examiner Rejection Metrics
In order to conduct the study, basic application information was
recorded, such as the application filing date and the issue date, to
determine the number of days the application was in prosecution. Then
priority documents associated with each individual patent were recorded,
if present. Specifically, it was first determined whether there was a
provisional application associated with the patent. Additionally, it was
determined whether there was a priority application that was associated
with either a foreign filing or a U.S. parent application. If there was an
associated U.S. parent, it was determined whether the same examiner had
reviewed the parent application." This was done to determine whether
either slow or fast examiners had a higher proportion of applications
within a larger family, and whether that same examiner had reviewed
applications from that larger family.
Rejections based on 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 were then
documented. All prosecution histories reviewed were from pre-AIA
applications. 5 2 Specifically, rejections were recorded based on Section
102(a), (b), and (e) prior art. 53 The same type of analysis was done for
Section 103 rejections. For each prior art rejection, it was determined
what type of prior art was used: (1) U.S. patent, (2) U.S. patent
application, (3) foreign patent, (4) foreign patent application, or (5)
printed publication. Finally, the total number of unique references used
was captured for all Section 102 and 103 rejections. 54 These data attempt
to determine how many total references were used during prosecution to
get an idea of the breadth and scope of the examiner's search.
B. Applicant Response Metrics
Similar to the examiner side, a review was conducted of every
response filed by the applicants to every non-final and final Office

51 See infra Appendices Al, A2, Bl, B2.

52 Accordingly, all 35 U.S.C. § 102 and § 103 rejections were from pre-AIA applications (before
March 16, 2013).
53 See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2011title3 5/pdf/USCODE-201 1 -title35-partll-chapl0-sec 102.pdf [https://penna.cc/8YCJ-2KTL]. No
other Section 102 rejection were found in this dataset. Accordingly, there were no rejections based
on Sections 102(c), (d), (f), or (g). See id. Additionally, there were no Section 102 rejections based
on the "on sale" or "public use." See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2018), https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2018-title35/pdf/USCODE-2018-title35-partli-chapl0secl02.pdf [https://perma.cc/94F7-67FA].
54 "Unique references" are especially important for rejections based on obviousness under Section
103. See 35 U.S.C. § 103, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2018-title35/pdf/
USCODE-2018-title35-partli-chaplO-seclO3.pdf [https://penna.cc/8YXL-T9UZ]. For example, if
the examiner rejected claim one based on References A and B, and also rejected claim one based
on References A and C, the study would only account for three references, not four. Furthermore,
if the examiner used the same reference in any subsequent rejections, then that reference was not
counted again.
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Action. For each rejection, there was an effort to characterize the type of
argument used to traverse the prior art rejection.
For Section 102 (a), (g), or (e) anticipation rejections based on
prior art," the study coded for traversal strategies based on: (1) claim
amendments, (2) missing element argument(s), (3) no motivation to
modify argument(s), (4) prior art reference was not enabled argument(s),
(5) reference is not prior art using a 131 declaration, 5 6 or (6) "other"
argument(s).57 Additionally, the study recorded the number of times a 132
declaration58 was used in conjunction with the applicant's arguments. For
Section 102(b) anticipation rejections based on prior art, the study coded
for traversal strategies based on: (1) claim amendments, (2) missing
element argument(s), (3) no motivation to modify, or (4) "other"
argument(s). 5 9 Similar to the approach to Section 102 (a), (g), or (e), the
study also recorded the number of times a 132 declaration was submitted
to traverse the rejection 6 0 in conjunction with the applicant's arguments.
Finally, for Section 103 obviousness type rejections based on
prior art, the study coded for traversal strategies based on: (1) claim
amendments, (2) missing element argument(s), (3) no motivation to
modify argument(s), (4) no motivation to combine argument(s), (5)
reference is not prior art using a 131 declaration, (6) prior art reference is
not enabled argument(s), (7) reference teaches away from invention
argument(s), (8) unexpected results argument(s), (9) not obvious to try
argument(s), (10) no expectation of success argument(s), and (11) "other"
argument(s). 6 1 Additionally, it recorded the number of times a 132
declaration was submitted to traverse the rejection in conjunction with
the applicant's arguments. 6 2
IV.

RESULTS

As an initial matter, the difference in prosecution times for each
group of examiners was significant. While fast examiners, on average,
issued patents 620 days (1.7 years) after the application date, average

55 These include rejections based on Section 102(a), (g), (e), and (b). No other Section 102 prior

art rejections were found in this dataset.
56 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.131(a) (2019), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2019-title37-voll/
pdf/CFR-2019-title37-voll-secl-131 .pdf [https://pena.cc/C3KX-5GZQ].
57 The "'other' argument(s)" category was used as a catch-all if the argument used in prosecution
did not squarely fit in a previously mentioned category.
58 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.132, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2019-title37-voll/pdf/CFR2019-title37-voll-secl-132.pdf [https://penna.cc/4UZX-2H9J]; see also MPEP, supra note 13, §
716.
59 The "'other' arguments" category acted as a catch-all for those arguments used during
prosecution that did not squarely fit into one of the three preceding categories.
60 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.132; see also MPEP, supra note 13, § 716.
61 The "'other' arguments" category acted as a catch-all for those arguments used during
prosecution that did not squarely fit into one of the ten preceding categories.
62 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.132; see also MPEP, supra note 13, § 716.
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examiners issued patents 1,121 days (3.07 years) after the application
date, and slow examiners issued patents 2,138 days (5.86 years) after the
application date. Thus, fast examiners are almost twice as fast as average
examiners, and more than three times as fast as slow examiners.
A. StatisticalAnalysis
In each section, graphs will be used to summarize the data along
with their corresponding statistical analysis. Additionally, some graphs
will contain a separate table showing which group of examiners are
statistically different from other groups. These tables contain the letters
A, B, or C. The letter A denotes that the group of examiners has the largest
frequency of that particular metric. The letter B denotes the second largest
frequency and is significantly different from A and C. The letter C
denotes the smallest frequency and is significantly smaller than A or B.
Several groups may contain the same letter, which connotates that there
is no significant difference between those groups. The designation ofA/B
means that the group is not statistically different from either A or B.
The Kruskal-Wallis test is used to test whether a variable is
different among the three examiner groups. 63 The "Level-Level" columns
indicate the order of subtraction, and the p-values show significance. The
"SMD" column represents the "Score Mean Difference," which is
calculated from the ranks of the numbers from the whole dataset. The
formula for SID is SMD
[
{Sum
of group ] scores - 0.5}/nl - [Sum of
group 2 scores + 0.5}/n2. A positive SID represents that the first group
has larger scores than the second, while a negative SMD represents that
the second group has larger scores. A p-value that is less than five percent
shows that the difference is significant.
The pair-by-pair Kruskal-Wallis test is generally used for
considering the ranks of the numbers within any pair of examiner groups
and may cause problems for a test of more than two groups. This study
therefore used Dunn's test as well, because the Dunn's test considers all
the groups as a whole when finding ranks of the numbers. 6 4
Additionally, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used to test whether
there is significant difference in a certain variable among the three
examiner groups. 6 5 The chi-squared test and p-value show how the
examiners are different regarding a certain variable. For each variable,

63 William H. Kruskal & W. Allen Wallis, Use ofRanks in One-CriterionVariance Analysis, 47 J.
AM. STAT. ASS'N 583 (1952), http://webspace.ship.edu/pgmarr/Geo441/Readings/Kruskal%/`20and
%20Wallis%201952%20-%2OUse%200fo2ORanks%20in%200ne-Criterion%2OVariance%20
Analysis.pdf [https://perna.cc/QHH7-8AYP].
64 Olive Jean Dunn, Multiple Comparisons Among Means, 56 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 52 (1961),
https://sci2s.ugr.es/keel/pdf/algorithni/articulo/1961-BonferroniDunn-JASA.pdf
[https://penna.
cc/VC43-UCAA].
65 Kruskal & Wallis, supra note 63.
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the variables are grouped (as indicated by letters) by whether they are
different from each other. While same letters represent same groups, the
letter A represents a higher score than the letter B, and the letter B
represents a higher score than the letter C.
B. GeneralProsecutionHistory Statistics
1.

Priority Documents Metrics

As an initial matter, this study determined whether any group of
examiners (slow, average, or fast) had a disproportionate amount of
priority applications. Specifically, it determined whether the patent
examined had a priority to a provisional application, continuation
application, continuation in part application, divisional application, or
foreign priority document. 6 6 This determination is important because an
examiner may have previously reviewed a family member of the current
application. If the examiner had previously reviewed a parent or related
application, it would allow the examiner to review the current application
more quickly. This is because the examiner is likely to be more familiar
with the technology, as well as the prior art from the previous priority
document and a prior review of the related specification.
First, these data show that average examiners have a slightly
higher number of priority documents compared to either the fast or the
slow examiners. 6 7 In contrast, fast examiners do not have a significantly
higher number of patents that claim priority when compared to slow
examiners. Interestingly, all examiners (slow, average, and fast) receive
approximately the same number of applications that claim priority to a
provisional application. 68 However, the slow examiners have a
significantly smaller number of applications that they had previously
reviewed as a related family member. 6 9 Average and fast examiners did
not have a significant difference in the number of previously examined
related applications.
2. Length of Office Actions and Responses
In order to capture the detail present in each Office Action, the
number of pages was used as a proxy for the verbosity of the examiner's
Office Action. The study determined that slow examiners give a larger
number of rejections per Office Action and so, unsurprisingly, slow
examiners have much longer Office Actions. Slow examiners have
significantly longer Office Actions than their average or fast counterparts

66
67
68
69

See infra
See infra
See infra
See infra

Appendices
Appendices
Appendices
Appendices

Al,
Al,
Bl,
Bl,
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A2.
B2.
B2.
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(total pages/number of Office Actions + 1).70 For the "total pages"
analysis, the denominator includes the number of Office Actions plus
one. The added value of "plus one" in the denominator was included to
capture those examiners who allow a case with a first action allowance.
This is true for both non-final Office Actions (NFOAs), as well as final
Office Actions (FOAs).
The study found that average Office Action length for slow
examiners (6.4 pages) is almost twice the length as that of fast examiners
(3.6 pages). Slow examiners write significantly longer non-final Office
Actions (11.6 pages) than average examiners (9.2 pages) or fast
examiners (8.6). Interestingly, this gap increases dramatically when it
comes to final Office Actions (12.3 pages compared to 8.9 and 6.1 pages).
Thus, slow examiners are writing longer non-final Office Actions and
much longer final Office Actions as compared to their average and fast
counterparts.
C. ExaminerRejection StatisticsBased on 35 US. C. §§ 102 and
103 Anticipationand Obviousness Based on PriorArt
First, this study determined if examiners were using different
types of rejections based on their classification as slow, average, or fast
examiners. It focused only on prior art rejections based on Section 102(a),
(g), or (e) (prior art only), Section 102(b) (prior art only), and Section 103
(prior art).71 It then looked at the associated applicant responses. 7 2
Unsurprisingly, both slow and average examiners tend to give
many more Section 102 and 103 rejections as compared to their fast
counterparts. These data extend what was previously shown with junior
and senior examiners. 73 Similar to previous studies, which show that
junior examiners are more likely to use prior art rejections as compared
to their senior counterparts, this study shows that both average and slow
examiners use more prior art rejections as compared to their fast
counterparts.
Prior art rejections tend to be the most time-consuming rejections
for examiners because they require a detailed search, as well as a
substantive comparison between the prior art and the claimed invention.
A comprehensive prior art search requires the examiner to not only
understand the claimed invention, but also where it sits within the larger

70 See infra Appendices Cl, C2.
71 A separate study, not addressed in this Article, will examine the role of rejections based on
statutory type double patenting, obviousness-type double patenting, utility, and patentable subject
matter under Section 101, and rejections based first on written description and enablement, and
second on indefiniteness under Section 112.
72 See discussion supra Section II.B.
73 See Lemley & Sampat, supra note 3, at 821-22, 821 tbl.3; see also Frakes & Wasserman, supra
note 1.
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technological environment. Additionally, a well-written prior art
rejection requires the examiner to understand the prior art and how it is
similar to and different from the claimed invention. Furthermore, an
appropriate prior art rejection will require the applicant to either amend
the claim or abandon the application. Finally, prior art rejections are the
most common method by which patents are invalidated during
litigation. 7 4 Accordingly, examiners may spend a disproportionate
amount of their allotted examination time searching, reviewing,
comparing, and composing a prior art rej ection.
Figure 2 and Table 1 show the relative number of prior art
rejections found per Office Action for slow, average, and fast
examiners.7 1 Slow examiners have almost five times as many Section
102(a), (g), or (e) rejections, almost two times as many Section 102(b)
rejections, and almost six time as many Section 103(a) rejections as
compared to their fast counterparts. Accordingly, these data show that
slow examiners give (statistically significant) more pnior art rejections as
compared to fast examiners.
Interestingly, this result is not identical when comparing slow
examiners with average examiners. Specifically, slow examiners and
average examiners generate approximately the same number of
anticipation rejections (Section 102 rejections). However, slow
examiners give approximately 1.5 times as many obviousness rejections
as compared to their average counterparts.
Figure 2.
35 US~C 102 and103S Rejections

74 See Shine Tu, InvalidatedPatents andAssociatedPatentExaminers, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.

L. 135, 160 (2015), http://www.jetlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/TuSPE_6-FINAL.pdf
[https://penna.cc/2FTW-HRV5]. However, many patents that are invalidated based on Section 102
or Section 103 prior art are not initially discovered by the examiner during patent prosecution.
Instead, most invalidated patents based on prior art are typically discovered by third parties after
patent prosecution.
75 See infra Figure 2; see also infra Table 1.

414

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

[Vol. 38:2

Table 1.
RejectionOA

Fast A

0MD~~

a

y-,alu BM

ast

~he

SM

lon

au

D. Applicant Responses to 35 U S.. 102-Anticipation
Rejections Based on PriorArt

Although slow and average examiners may be producing
approximately the same number of anticipation rejections, these data
alone cannot determine the quality of these rejections. Similarly, these
data alone cannot determine if the relatively few anticipation and
obviousness rejections generated by fast examiners are valid.
Specifically, by looking only at the examiner's rejections, it is difficult to
tell if these prior art rejections are strong or weak. Accordingly, the
applicant responses are necessary to help determine the validity of these
rej ections.
The methods by which applicants respond to the examiner's prior
art rejection can help reveal the strength of the rejection. Specifically, if
a claim amendment is the sole argument used to traverse the rejection, it
may signal that the prior art rejection was a strong rejection. 7 6
Conversely, if a missing elements argument is the sole method used to
traverse the prior art rejection, it may signal that the prior art rejection
was a weak rejection because the examiner misunderstood either the prior
art or the claimed invention. This study uses the applicant responses as a
proxy to help determine the strength or weakness of the examiner's prior
art rejection.
1.

Applicant Responses to 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (g), or (e)Anticipation Rejections Based on Prior Art

As an initial matter, the study recorded each type of reference
used in the Section 102(a), (g), or (e) rejections.77 These data show that
76 It is understood, however, that there are many reasons an applicant may only use a claim
amendment to traverse a prior art rejection that has nothing to do with the strength of the rejection.
These reasons include speeding up prosecution or avoiding the attorneys' fees required to create a
strong rebuttal. See Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 151, 153 (2004), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5250&
context=uclrev [https://perma.cc/UE3J-65Q6] ("[T]he patent holder bears the burden of
establishing the reason for any narrowing amendment, and, where no explanation can be

established, courts are to presume that estoppel applies."); see also Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
77 See infra Appendix D. Notably, the study averages the number of references over all Office
Actions in the prosecution history. Because not every Office Action will have an anticipation
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U.S. patents are the most frequently used source of 102(a), (g), or (e) prior
art. Additionally, slow examiners use almost nine times as many
references per Office Action as compared to a fast examiner and over 1.5
times as many references per Office Action as compared to an average
examiner.
The methods by which applicants responded to the examiner's
Section 102(a), (g), or (e) rejections were also different depending on
which examiner type made the rejection. As shown in Figure 3 and Table
2, claim amendments are the most common way applicants traverse prior
art rejections based on Section 102(a), (g), or (e) prior art.7 8 However,
Figure 3 and Table 2 demonstrate that many more applicants responded
to slow examiners by arguing that the prior art had a missing element
when compared to the claimed invention. 7 9 Additionally, with slow
examiners, many applicants used a 131 declaration to antedate the prior
art. Overall, applicants would much less frequently use a 132 declaration
to try to overcome a Section 102(a), (g), or (e) prior art rejection
regardless of which type of examiner they encountered.
An anticipation rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (g), or (e)
requires that each and every element of the claimed invention be
disclosed in a single prior art reference.80 Applicants who argue against
this type of rejection based on a "missing elements"-type response are
basically arguing that the prior art reference lacks at least one element in
the claimed invention. The argument relies on the fact that the examiner
has either misunderstood the claimed invention or the prior art reference.
It is notable that some applicants make a claim amendment in conjunction
with an argument that the modified claim now adds an element that is
missing in the prior art reference. If an applicant made both a claim
amendment and a missing element argument based on that new claim
amendment, then the data was recorded only as a "claim amendment" and
not as a "missing element" argument. This is because if a claim
amendment adds an element, then the examiner may have correctly
interpreted both the claimed invention and the prior art reference.
Importantly, slow examiners encounter the missing elements
argument more than other examiners. Furthermore, it is the most common
argument made by applicants against Section 102(a), (g), or (e) rejections
from slow examiners. Figure 3 and Table 2 show that slow examiners
receive about three times as many missing element arguments as
compared to their fast or average examiner counterparts." Thus, slow
rejection, there can be less than one reference per Office Action when averaged over all Office
Actions in the application's prosecution history.
78 See infra Figure 3; see also infra Table 2.
79 See infra Figure 3; see also infra Table 2.
80 See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. 102 (2018); see also MPEP, supra note 13, § 2131.
81 See infra Figure 3; see also infra Table 2.
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examiners may be either misinterpreting the prior art or the claimed
invention at a much higher rate than their average or fast examiner
counterparts. Interestingly, applicants rarely must make claim
amendments to overcome an anticipation rejection when dealing with a
fast examiner. In contrast, claim amendments are over four times more
likely to occur to overcome an anticipation rejection when dealing with a
slow or average examiner.
Figure 3.
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In addition, Figure 4 and Table 3 show that claim amendments
and the missing elements arguments are the most frequent ways
applicants traverse Section 102(b) rejections. 8 2 Like the novelty
rejections based on Section 102(a), (g), or (e), slow examiners force
applicants to make claim amendments nearly twice as frequently as fast
examiners. Additionally, the missing elements argument occurs more
than twice as frequently with slow examiners as compared to fast
examiners. Accordingly, one interpretation of these data is that slow
examiners misunderstand either the prior art or the claimed invention at
a much higher rate than fast examiners.
Interestingly, all examiners who use Section 102(b) rejections are
mainly using printed publications as prior art.83 However, examiners are
still also using U.S. patents to a large degree. Unsurprisingly, average and
slow examiners use approximately 1.5 more U.S. patent references per
Office Action than their fast examiner counterparts. Surprisingly, fast,
average, and slow examiners all use approximately the same number of
printed publications per Office Action when making a Section 102(b)
rejection. These data suggest that when searching for Section 102(b) prior
art, all examiners most likely use outside searches that focus on nonpatent literature.
Figure 4.
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82 See infra Figure 4; see also infra Table 3.
83 See infra Appendix E (outlining the total number of references, as well as the type of references
being used by each examiner). Notably, the study averages the number of references over all Office
Actions in the prosecution history. Because not every Office Action will have an anticipation
rejection, there can be less than one reference per Office Action when averaged over all Office
Actions in the application's prosecution history.
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35 U.S.C. § 103 obviousness rejections are one of the most
important and common means by which examiners reject applications
and litigators
invalidate patents.8 40663
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Aspresete typically
Many of the patents reviewed were patents with pre-KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc. 86 application dates that were issued post-KSR. This is
important because KSR greatly blunted the motivation to combine
arguments, although some commentators argue there is a growing
87
resurgence of this type of argument.
1.

35 U.S.C. § 103

Claim Amendment Traversal Argument

As presented in Figure 5 and Table 4, a common way an applicant
addresses an obviousness rejection is to make claim amendments.8 8 This
strategy is similar to that seen in the anticipation context. That is,
applicants Will change one or more elements of the claim to address the
issues that concern the examiner. In the anticipation context, this usually

84 Tu, supra note 74, at 15 1. However, many of the patents invalidated by either Section 102 or

Section 103 prior art are not initially discovered by the patent examiner during prosecution. Instead,
most invalidated patents based on prior art are discovered by third parties after patent prosecution.
85 See infra Figures 5, 6; see also ira Tables 4, 5.
86 See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
87 See Chao Gao & Peter M. Jay, Ten Years after KSR, Mfotivation to Combine Mfoves Back into
the Spotlight, 10 LANDSLIDE 23 (2018); see also In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1381-85
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that the FlAB needs to sufficiently explain why a person of ordinary skill
in the art would have been motivated to combine the prior art teachings to arrive at the claimed
invention).
88 See infra Figure 5; see also infra Table 4.
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means narrowing the claims to exclude the prior art or adding an element
that is not present in one or more of the cited references.
Figure 5 and Table 4 reveal that claim amendments are used most
frequently to overcome obviousness rejections from both slow and
average examiners. 89 However, claim amendments are rarely used when
applicants encounter a fast examiner. Surprisingly, applicants are eleven
times more likely to have to make a claim amendment when dealing with
an obviousness rejection from a slow or average examiner as compared
to a fast examiner. One interpretation of these data is that slow and
average examiners correctly force applicants to narrow the scope of their
claims in light of the prior art. However, when looking at all of the
traversal strategies applicants use to overcome the obviousness rej ection,
a different pattern emerges.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 103-Missing Element(s) Traversal Argument
Figure 5 and Table 4 establish that the most common response to
an obviousness rejection from any type of examiner is a "missing
elements" argument. 90 The basis for this argument is identical in an
obviousness context and an anticipation context. In both contexts,
applicants argue that when each reference is combined, there is still one
or more element(s) lacking. Because the reference(s) does not describe
each and every element of the claimed invention, applicants argue that
the rejection is improper.
However, there is a great disparity between the frequency of this
argument among the three types of examiners. The missing element(s)
argument is used mostly against slow examiners when compared to
average or fast examiners. In fact, applicants use this argument over 4.5
times more frequently with slow examiners as compared to fast
examiners and over 1.5 times more frequently with slow examiners as
compared to average examiners. Similar to the anticipation arguments,
one interpretation of these data is that slow examiners simply do not
understand the prior art and/or the claimed invention.
3.

35 U.S.C. § 103- No Motivation to Combine Traversal
Argument

Because an obviousness rejection usually relies on two or more
references, examiners typically give a reason why a person of ordinary
skill in the art would combine the cited references to result in the claimed
invention. 91 One common traversal strategy is for the applicant to argue

89 See infra Figure 5; see also infra Table 4.
90 See infra Figure 5; see also infra Table 4.
91 See Ali Mojibi, An Empirical Study of the Effect ofKSR v. Teleflex on the Federal Circuit's
Patent Validity Jurisprudence, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 559 (2010), http://
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that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have no motivation to
combine the references cited by the examiner. This argument is usually
based on the fact that one or more references are not from the same field
as the claimed invention, or that the reference is not reasonably pertinent
to the particular problem with which the invention is involved. These
types of arguments were coded as a "no motivation to combine"
argument.
Appendix F shows that the problem is compounded by the fact
that slow examiners are using approximately seven times as many
references as fast examiners, and approximately 1.5 times as many
references as average examiners. 92 Notably, this study averaged the
number of references over all Office Actions in the prosecution history.
Because not every Office Action will have an obviousness rejection, there
can be less than two references per Office Action when averaged over all
Office Actions in the application's prosecution history.
Interestingly, Figure 5 and Table 4 show that slow examiners
experience the "no motivation to combine" argument 30.5 times more
frequently than fast examiners, and two times more frequently than an
average examiner. 93 Accordingly, slow examiners may be bringing in
prior art that is too distant or non-relevant when making their obviousness
rejections. Similar to the missing elements argument, this type of
argument usually relies on the fact that the examiner has either
misunderstood the claimed invention or misunderstood one or more of
the prior art references.
Figure 5.
Applicnt Rpoes

103-CAca

to3USC103 Prior Ai
Rejections

103- missng eneica

103- no mztivtion to

X 10-o mo tv ao to

www.albanylawjournal.org/Documents/Articles/20.3 .559-Mojibi.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4J558WWR]; see also Gao & Jay, supra note 87; see also Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The
Federal Circuit and Patentability:An EmpiricalAssessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 2051 (2007), https://scholarship.1aw.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1098&context
-faculty scholarship [https://perma.cc/26NG-266D].
92 See infra Appendix F (outlining the total number of references, as well as the type of references
being used by each examiner).
93 See infra Figure 5; see also infra Table 4.
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Use of 131 and 132 Declarations

Use of 131 and 132 declarations in an obviousness context is
basically identical to use of these declarations in a Section 102(a), (g) or
(e) context. Figure 6 and Table 5 outline how frequently applicants
attempt to counter a Section 103 rejection using these declarations. 9 4
Similar to the findings regarding applicant response rates to Section
102(a), (g), or (e) rejections, applicants more frequently use 131
declarations to overcome a Section 103 rejection from slow examiners
when compared to their fast counterparts. Interestingly, 132 declarations
are also much more frequently used by applicants who are working with
slow examiners when compared with average or fast examiners. These
132 declarations are oftentimes expert testimony used to help the
examiner interpret either the prior art or the claimed invention. 9 5 Often,
132 declarations are used to refute an examiner's misunderstanding or
misinterpretation of either the claimed invention or the prior art
reference(s).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 103-Teaching Away Traversal Strategy
To successfully apply a teaching away argument, the applicant
must show that the prior art reference would have actually motivated a
person of skill in the art to move away from the claimed solution to the
problem. 9 6 A teaching away argument requires more than just a general
preference for an alternative invention, but also requires the prior art to
advocate abandoning or discouraging investigation in the claimed
solution in the patent application. 97 When an applicant is successful in
making a teaching away argument, the examiner's prior art is usually
relevant, but often shows the opposite result than the examiner intends.

94
95
96
97

See infra Figure 6; see also infra Table 5.
See MPEP, supra note 13, § 716.
See id. § 2145.
See Meiresonne v. Google, Inc., 849 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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Accordingly, when successful, a teaching away argument is usually good
evidence that the examiner has significantly misinterpreted the prior art.
Importantly, Figure 6 and Table 5 expose the fact that applicants
who are paired with slow examiners much more frequently use a teaching
away result or argument to overcome a Section 103 rejection.98 These
arguments are important because both types of arguments usually rely on
the examiner misunderstanding the technological field of the invention.
Slow examiners experience a teaching away argument at rate of almost
four times higher and more than fast examiners and more than 1.5 times
more than average examiners. 99 One interpretation of these data is that
the examiner is utterly misunderstanding either the prior art reference or
the claimed invention.
6.

35 U.S.C. § 103-Unexpected Results Traversal Strategy

When applicants use an unexpected results argument against an
obviousness rejection, they usually argue that synergistic results or
unexpected properties occur that make the claimed invention nonobvious. Unexpected results in an application can be based on a number
of factors, including: (1) greater than or less than expected results, (2) the
superiority of a property shared with the prior art, (3) the presence of an
unexpected property, and/or (4) the absence of an expected property. 100
Admittedly, these unexpected results may be difficult for an examiner to
detect when reviewing the application. Synergistic results might not leap
out of the specification, especially if the unexpected result is buried
within a number of experiments described in the specification.
Slow examiners experience the unexpected results argument 3.5
times more frequently than fast examiners and almost two times more
frequently than slow examiners. It may be that these examiners are not
reviewing the specification closely when comparing the results of the
claimed invention to the prior art references. Alternatively, it may be that
slow examiners, in a rush to accumulate many prior art references, simply
to do not closely review the results presented in the prior reference.

98 See infra Figure 6; see also infra Table 5.
99 See infra Figure 6; see also infra Table 5.
100 See MPEP, supra note 13, § 716.02(a).
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traversal strategy is that the disclosure provided in the prior art cannot be
produced without undue experimentation. Usually, applicants argue that
merely naming or describing the subject is not enough and that a person
of ordinary skill in the art could not have combined the reference's
description of the invention With their own knowledge to make the
claimed invention. 101
As a general matter, prior art references are presumed to be
operable.102 This default rule is unsurprising because most prior art

references are either patents or patent applications that must overcome
the enablement requirement. These arguments are especially difficult to
make against an obviousness rejection because even if a reference
discloses an inoperative device, it is prior art for all that it teaches.103
101 See id. § 2121.01; see also Elan Pharm., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 346
F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
102 See MPEP, supra note
also In re Antor Media Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
103 See MPEP, supra note 13, 2121; see also Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB,
892 F.2d 1547, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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Thus, "a non-enabling reference may qualify as prior art for the purpose
of determining obviousness under [Section] 103."104
As an initial matter, both the "prior art not enabled" and "no
motivation to modify" arguments occur at very low frequencies in this
dataset.10 Neither of these traversal strategies employed by applicants
significantly differs between slow, average, or fast examiners.
Accordingly, there is no significant difference in the use of these
arguments in the obviousness context.
F. Implications and Possible Solutions
The goal of any patent examination process is to be fair,
transparent, and consistent with the rules of patentability. As an
aspirational goal, this is fraught with trials and tribulations, many of
which are outside the control of both patent examiners and applicants.
This Article makes no normative judgment as to the "optimal" or "ideal"
allowance rate. Each patent application must be adjudicated on its own
merits. With that said, this and previous studies show that the system falls
woefully short of satisfying any "ideal" allowance rate. 106 Currently, the
system is such that an applicant's ability to obtain a patent may be tied to
who they receive as an examiner.
There are, however, arguments for adjusting the aggregate
allowance rate both up or down. Commentators who worry about
granting "low quality" patents discuss mechanisms to enhance rejection
rates, strengthen post-grant review and IPRs, or create a two-tier patent
system. 107 In contrast, other commentators worry that the allowance rate
is too low and fear that examiners are rejecting "high-quality" patents;
they thus wish to develop mechanisms to enhance allowance rates using
strategies such as the use of continuation or RCE practice.108
This Article argues that behaviors on both extremes can harm the
patent system. At its core, patent prosecution is a negotiation between the
examiner and the applicant. An applicant's ability to obtain a patent
should not be tied to the random assignment of a "hard" or "easy"
Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
See infra Figure 6; see also infra Table 5.
See Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw, supra note 1, at 14; see also Tu, Three New Aetrics for
PatentExaminer Activity, supra note 1; see also JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT
104
105
106

FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2009).

See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking PatentLaw 's Presumption of Validity, 60
STAN. L. REV. 45 (2007), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2010/04/
LichtmanLemley.pdf [https://perna.cc/4CB5-HR7U] (arguing for the creation of a two-tiered
system of patent validity); see also Mark Lemley et al., What to Do about Bad Patents?, REG.,
Winter 2005-2006, at 10, 12-13, https://www.immagic.com/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/
STANFORD/SO51208L.pdf [https://perna.cc/Z4F9-8352].
108 See Deepak Hegde et al., Quick and Dirty Patents (Jan. 5, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with SSRN), https://mgmt.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Quick-And-DirtyPatents.pdf [https://perna.cc/JJT8-SYV3] ("[Q]uick and dirty, rather than slow and thorough,
patents maximize both inventor rewards and positive externalities to rivals.").
107
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examiner. Accordingly, it is important to implement strategies that bring
low volume examiners more in line with average volume examiners by
creating disincentives for bad rejections. Similarly, it is important to
implement strategies that bring high volume examiners more in line with
average volume examiners by creating procedures for reviewing bad
allowances.
1.

Target Examiners Who Deviate Drastically from the Norm
for Enhanced Review by Quality Assurance

From these data, it can be seen that low volume examiners receive
more missing elements and teaching away type arguments against
anticipation and obviousness rejections. In contrast, high volume
examiners have a disproportionate number of first action allowances.
Both of these behaviors may be harming the consistent and fair
application of the patentability rules. Accordingly, examiners who have
a high number of first action allowances, or a high rejection rate
combined with an applicant's use of specific arguments such as missing
element(s) and/or teaching away, should be flagged more for Quality
Assurance. A second pair of eyes can be used to review examiners who
are making bad rej ections or bad allowances.
If Quality Assurance determines that there is an error in either the
rejection or the allowance, then perhaps one remedy would be to deduct
counts. An additional remedy would be to require the examiner to attend
specialized training in proper prior art rejections. Furthermore, if the
examiner is a junior examiner without signatory authority, perhaps a
further remedy would be to require the primary examiner who is working
with the junior examiner to create a remediation plan.
2. Deduct Counts for Bad Rejections and Add Counts for
Difficult Applicants
As argued above, examiners are clearly incentivized by the count
system. Accordingly, one of the easiest ways to modify behavior is to
modify the count system. One quick and easy way to disincentivize "bad"
rejections is to deduct the counts associated with these poor rejections so
that the examiners who make them must internalize their mistake. The
loss attention effect may also play a role in helping examiners be more
careful about making "bad" rejections. 109

109 Loss attention posits that individuals will allocate more attention to a task when it involves
losses than when it does not involve losses. See Eldad Yechiam & Guy Hochman, Losses as
Modulators of Attention: Review and Analysis of the Unique Effects of Losses Over Gains, 139
PSYCHOL. BULL. 497 (2013); see also Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis ofDecision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979), https://www.uzh.ch/cmsssl/suz/
dam/jcr:00000000-64a0-5b lc-0000-00003b7ec704/10.05-kahneman-tversky-79.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/HR2C-KCKD].

426

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

[Vol. 38:2

There are many situations where an examiner may make a
legitimate mistake in understanding or applying the law. Additionally,
there are many situations where the law may not be clear when applied
to a specific application. Deduction of counts should not occur in these
cases. Deduction of counts should only occur in clear cases where a
pattern of gamesmanship or erroneous rejections throughout the
prosecution history is unveiled.
Deduction of count(s) should be a sua sponte remedy given by:
Quality Assurance at the PTO (before the patent issues), the PTAB,
and/or the Federal Circuit. Applicants should not be able to request count
deduction as a remedy for erroneous rej ections. The fear is that applicants
may try to leverage perceived "bad" rejections as a bargaining chip to
remove counts to get the examiner to allow the case. 110
On the other side of this coin is when applicants prolong
prosecution by offering a deluge of illegitimate arguments designed
simply to "wear down" the examiner."1 One solution to this problem may
be to allow the examiner to impose a shortened statutory response period
that is less than the standard three months. 112 This would force the
applicant to internalize the bad argument by paying more for any
extensions of time. This might be especially appealing when the
arguments made by the applicant are repetitive and put forward solely to
delay prosecution.1 13 These extensions of time fees can range from small
($200 for a one-month extension) to fairly large ($3,000 for a five-month
extension).
3.

Alert Examiners When Their Issued Cases are Litigated

Not all post-issuance litigation information is uploaded to PAIR,
and examiners are not notified of events that occur post-issuance with
applications that they have previously examined. As an initial matter,
examiners would be professionally interested in the patents that are
litigated under their watch. Additionally, this may be a learning
experience for the examiners to see how the court actually dealt with a
situation that the examiner may experience again. Simply alerting the
110 For most applicants, any rejection is a "bad" rejection. Accordingly, a flood of requests for
count deductions may occur if applicants could petition for this type of remedy.
111 See Lemley & Sampat, supra note 17, at 123 ("[T]he PTO has no power to finally reject a
determined applicant.").
112 Allowing the examiner to petition for additional counts should not be the remedy because
examiners may try to argue that every argument is repetitive. Additionally, if an argument is
repetitive, then any response to that argument would also be repetitive. Accordingly, if all the work
by an examiner could be duplicated in a new Office Action, then extra counts would not be justified.
113 Applicants have many reasons why they may wish to delay prosecution, such as waiting for
competitors to get something to market. Once competitors have a product on the market, applicants
can then narrow their claims to cover the specific product, which may make a claim more difficult
to invalidate. This strategy only works if the applicant can delay prosecution long enough to await
the arrival of a commercial product.
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examiner to the fact that one of their patents was litigated and possibly
invalidated may make the examiner more careful about "bad" rejections
or force the examiner to complete a more exhaustive prior art search.
Creating an opportunity to understand the results and consequences of
their allowances may be a good teaching tool for examiners, especially if
they receive direct guidance from a written opinion from either the PTAB
or the Federal Circuit.
The PTO's Post Grant Outcomes program helps examiners
understand outcomes in related AIA trial proceedings.
The Post Grant Outcomes Program is a pilot program aimed to
provide examiners [with] the most [relevant] post grant information
from various sources, such as AIA trial proceedings before the PTAB.
The goal of this program is to improve the consistency of patentability
determinations in related pending patent applications by notifying
examiners when they have an application related to an AIA trial
proceeding, streamlining access to the contents of the AIA trial
proceedings, and determining and disseminating best practices for
evaluating those proceedings. 114
Moreover, beginning in 2019, "a feature was added to the examination
toolkit to facilitate and assist an examiner to readily access documents
directly related to a pending application.""' Since the program's
inception, "over 2,062 cases have been identified ... to assist examiners
in their examination process by not only making access to prior art easier,
but also by fostering improved patent quality." 1 16
To take this idea one step further, if examiners receive a notice
that a patent they issued is currently undergoing litigation, it might be a
worthwhile exercise to allow the examiner to write a short report/opinion
defending the application or use any new information gathered from
litigation to form a new rejection. This would be an internal document
used only for training. To incentivize examiners to write these reports,
the PTO should consider giving examiners one to two hours of time to
write this opinion. One could even imagine a system where the examiner
is given an additional count if the PTAB, district court, Federal Circuit,
and/or Supreme Court confirms the examiner's opinion.
4. Bifurcation of the Patent Searching and the Office Action
Writing Process
The main goal of this proposed solution is to get the best prior art
in front of the examiner as quickly as possible. Providing the examiner

114 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note

115

Id.

116

Id.

5, at 54.
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with the best prior art at the earliest stage of prosecution should speed up
the examination process, increase the efficiency of prosecution, and
improve prosecution quality.
As an initial matter, the PTO has tangentially addressed this issue
by creating a pilot program called the "Access to Relevant Prior Art
Initiative" to help get some relevant prior art to examiners.1 17 However,
this program focuses only on the references cited in related parent
applications. The main purpose of this program is to help applicants
comply with the duty of disclosure, and it is not designed to help discover
new prior art. Nonetheless, this is one step in the right direction to get
relevant prior art in front of the examiner. The program was designed to
create a single list of references, combining those references cited in an
application and those from related U.S. parent applications."' These
references would be automatically imported into a file for the examiner's
review. The scope of this program, however, is limited because it only
includes references cited in the instant application (by the applicant and
examiner) and imported references from immediate U.S. parent
applications (cited by the applicant and examiner). Importantly, it
specifically does not include references cited by third parties.
Additionally, it does not include any "new" references for the instant
application.
One issue that may be facing examiners is simply a lack of a deep
understanding and knowledge of the technical field. As examiners spend
more years at the PTO, they necessarily become more removed from their
research or laboratory backgrounds, and thus may not be as familiar with
the current literature. This solution attempts to address this issue by
creating a group of examiners who only focus on searching for prior art.
Therefore, this solution calls for a two-step process: first acquiring the
best prior art references, and then delivering the most relevant prior art
references into the hands of an examiner who specializes in drafting
Office Actions.
This solution calls for a bifurcation of the labor involved in the
patent examination process. Specifically, this division of labor would
create two distinct examination cores: (1) a first group that specializes in
prior art searching (searching examiners), and (2) a second group that
focuses on drafting Office Actions (drafting examiners). Specialization
would allow searching examiners time to keep up with the current
literature and hone their ability to create effective searches. Additionally,
specialization would allow drafting examiners to keep up with the current
117 See Access to Relevant PriorArt Initiative, USPTO: PATENTS, https://www.uspto.gov/patentsgetting-started/access-prior-art-project [https://penna.cc/P7PY-5TGU].
118 See id.; see also David Hricik, Access to PriorArt Initiative ofthe USPTO to Ease Importation

of PriorArt References from Parent Cases, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 3, 2020), https://patentlyo.com/
hricik/2020/02/initiative-importation-references.html [https://penna.cc/652D-MH5F].
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legal changes and refine their proficiency in drafting clear, concise, and
appropriate rejections.
Searching examiners would specialize in and have sole
responsibility for completing the prior art search. Thus, searching
examiners would have the ability to spend time specializing in creating
targeted keyword searches for a variety of inventions within the same art
unit or workgroup. Additionally, these examiners would have a deeper
knowledge of the current state of the art, as well as the most relevant
databases to search.
It should be noted that the PTO has already created programs to
enhance the examiner's subject matter expertise. For example, the Patent
Examiner Technical Training Program (PETTP) provides a forum for
industry and academic experts to provide technical training to examiners.
Additionally, the Site Experience Education (SEE) program allows
commercial, industrial, and academic institutions to host patent
examiners for site visits. Both programs help keep examiners abreast of
the most recent developments in innovation in their respective fields.
Drafting examiners would specialize in drafting Office Actions
based, in part, on the results of the prior art search generated by the
searching examiners. Drafting examiners would specialize in
understanding and applying the relevant patent law and would have sole
responsibility for composing the Office Action and applying the relevant
patentability rules. Thus, drafting examiners would have time to
understand and research current trends, case law, and changes in patent
law. Additionally, drafting examiners could spend more time obtaining
the writing skills necessary to convey clear rej ections. The PTO is already
addressing some of these issues by requiring all examiners to receive
training in areas of the law that are not currently well developed. 119 For
example, the PTO required patentable subject matter. 12 0 Notably,
"[a]lthough all patent examiners [were mandated to] receive[] training,
those examiners that were most impacted by the guidance [were required
to] receive[] more in-depth training and . . additional follow-on training
later in the year." 12 1
One advantage of this division of labor is that the examiner would
be limited to a universe of prior art when determining which references
to use when rej ecting the application. This would prevent examiners from
bringing in new but redundant art when making a rejection. This Article
recognizes that the searching examiner would have to complete a new
search, which may change the universe of available prior art if the claims
were altered during prosecution. However, this might still be
119 See U.S. PAThNT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 5, at 55.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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advantageous in an obviousness setting because the drafting examiner
might be required to use at least one new reference found by the searching
examiner after a claim amendment.
There are several limitations involved with this solution.
Foremost is a delay in prosecution caused by running the application
through two steps at the patent office. Additionally, bifurcation may lead
to a diminishment of the drafting examiners' knowledge of the relevant
prior art. This diminishment of knowledge in the field may lead to more
difficulty for the drafting examiner to gauge the novelty or nonobviousness of the invention if they are unable to understand how the
claimed invention sits within the larger technological field. Finally, with
particularly complex inventions, increased search costs may be
experienced when the invention is incorrectly classified because the
searching examiner may have to create new search terms or a new search
strategy when dealing with an unfamiliar technology (or simply transfer
the search to a different art unit).
CONCLUSION

Currently, an applicant's ability to obtain a patent in a reasonable
amount of time is, in large part, linked to the examiner who is assigned
to the application. This Article shows that the type of examiner assigned
to the case (whether a low, average, or high volume examiner) will affect
the application's time in prosecution. The duration of patent prosecution
can vary, on average, between about 1.5 and six years, depending on the
examiner type. Unnecessary delays in prosecution can result in increased
prosecution costs and attorneys' fees, as well as lost opportunities for
businesses that may need a patent to obtain venture capital funding or to
take advantage of other time-dependent market prospects.
Low volume examiners are making more obviousness and
anticipation rejections based on more prior art and facing more applicant
arguments that show that the examiner is misunderstanding either the
prior art or claimed invention. Conversely, high volume examiners may
be issuing patents too quickly without a thorough review of the prior art.
The goal of the patent examination system should be to be fair,
transparent, and to have consistent application of the rules of
patentability. This Article shows that examiners are not consistent when
applying the novelty and obviousness standards. Both types of examiners
may be harming innovation in two completely different ways.
As previously stated, there is no "optimal" grant rate. However,
it is possible to glean at least a "standard" grant rate by looking at the
grant rate from the "average" examiner. This Article argues for enhanced
review of examiners who are several standard deviations from the mean
(both low and high volume examiners). Recognizing that both low and
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high volume examiners are most likely maximizing counts, this Article
proposes some relatively easy solutions to dull gamesmanship-for
example, removing counts for clearly bad rejections or giving more time
or counts to examiners who write detailed PTAB appeal responses.
Finally, this Article proposes bifurcating the examination core into two
types of examiners: searching examiners, who function to find relevant
prior art, and drafting examiners, who function to apply the prior art to a
well-written Office Action.
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